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ABSTRACT
This study examines the mediation effect of capital structure decisions on the relationship 
between board process and company performance in Malaysia. The study uses two types of 
data; a questionnaire survey of Malaysian directors and the companies’ annual report. Based 
on 175 public listed companies, the study finds that effective independent directors and 
boards who monitor company risks vigorously are more likely to monitor management from 
adopting excessive leverage, which results in positive company performance. Overall findings 
are expected to serve as a basis for more effective corporate governance policies and practices 
in Malaysia in ensuring the sustainability of the listed companies.
Keywords: Board Process, Capital Structure, Company Performance, Independent Directors, 
Risk Oversight
1.  INTRODUCTION
The board of directors is one of the prominent corporate governance mechanisms as they are 
expected to monitor and protect the interests of shareholders. Even though previous corporate 
governance literatures recognize the importance of board of directors (Kula, 2005; Wan & 
Ong, 2005), the studies on the directors’ behavior and practices in conducting their roles are 
still lacking (Hasnah & Hasnah, 2009).  Most of previous studies focus on the direct effect of 
board structure, composition and characteristics on company performance or leverage (Noriza, 
2010; Rohana, Halimi & Erlane, 2009; Yu, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek, 2002). Such board 
attributes alone does not reflect the quality of the board, therefore, study on board process is 
highly demanded.  Board process refers to the approach taken by the directors in discharging 
their duties and the reflection of board’s decision making activities (Macus, 2008).  From the 
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theoretical perspectives, the board monitoring function is very important; it is derived from 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As decision making falls to top management, the 
board should vigorously monitor the decision making process and company performance as a 
whole (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) point out that board process influences company 
performance through strategic decisions. Decision on capital structure is the essential part of 
strategies implementation (David, 2008).  The cases of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in 
the United States and Linear Corporation Berhad in Malaysia have shown the evidences that 
highly leverage capital structure lead to company failure. Therefore, as proposed by Johnson 
et al. (1996) and David (2008) this study will incorporate leverage as mediator variable. The 
proposal is also similar to the recommendation by La Rocca (2007) where the author points 
out that board effectiveness, capital structure and company value should be incorporated in a 
study.  Based on above arguments, the main objective of this study is to determine the extent 
to which capital structure decision mediates the relationship between board process and 
company performance.
In this study, four prominent attributes represent the board process namely board’s risk 
oversight, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) performance evaluation, performance of independent 
directors and directors’ accessibility to information.  In analyzing whether company leverage 
mediates the relationship between board process and company performance, the study takes 
into consideration three conditions (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  The study presumes a significant 
direct relationship between (1) board process and capital structure decision and (2) board 
process and company performance. Then in the third (3) step, capital structure decision is 
treated as the intervening variable between board process and company performance. Figure 
1 illustrates the relationship between board process, capital structure decision and company 
performance.
Figure 1: Board Process, Capital Structure Decisions and Company Performance
Board Process
• Performance of independent  
 directors 
• Board’s risk oversight 
• CEO performance evaluation 
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The paper is organized as follows.  In the following section, the predictions on the influence 
of board process on capital structure decisions and company performance are presented. The 
third section presents the research methodology followed by the research findings in the fourth 
section.  Finally, the discussion and conclusion of the study is presented in the last section.  




2.  LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Board process attributes
2.1.1 Board’s risk oversight 
A business risk relates to the inability of a company to predict the future performance in an 
uncertain environment (Sobel & Reding, 2004). Therefore, the board roles in risk management 
are very important so as to ensure that the company will survive in uncertain economic 
conditions (Raber, 2003). The board is responsible to monitor the management decisions by 
asking them the possible risks that a company may be facing (Raber, 2003).  Besides, board 
is responsible for determining the company’s risk tolerance (Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG), 2012) so as to guide senior management in making decisions.  These 
practices in turn enhance the risk culture among the board members. By having an effective 
risk oversight, the decision making process by the management will always be monitored. 
With regards to company capital structure, such board attitudes are able to influence the 
management to take non-excessive leverage. Besides, Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) discover 
that a board that evaluates current and future internal and external corporate risks has a positive 
impact on company performance.  Boards that give less emphasizes on risk management can 
lead to company failure (Murphy & Brown, 2009). Therefore, this study expects a positive 
impact of board’s risk oversight on company leverage and performance.
2.1.2 CEO performance evaluation
CEO performance evaluation refers to the measurement and procedures that are established 
by the board to evaluate the CEO.  The evaluation process enables the board to keep track and 
provide suggestions about a CEO performance (Robbins & Judge, 2009).  This has positive 
consequences for companies as the CEOs become aware that they are being closely monitored 
and assessed by the board (Dulewicz & Herbert, 1999; 2004). The MCCG (Revised 2007) and 
MCCG (2012) recommend that the effectiveness and contributions of every director on the 
board, including the CEO, need to be assessed. Therefore, the CEOs need to pay extra attention 
to the decision making process as their performance will be accessed based on the outcomes 
of their decisions. In relation to capital structure, the CEOs prefer to avoid high risk decisions 
in order to mitigate the company from getting financial difficulties. In addition, the reflection 
of CEO performance can be seen in company profitability. Kula and Tatoglu (2006) and Kula 
(2005) find out that an effective performance evaluation contributes to positive company 
performance. Hence, the evaluation towards CEO performance by the board is expected to 
have effect on company performance.  
2.1.3 Performance of independent directors
Independent directors are expected to monitor independently the management work and 
decisions (Shamsher & Zulkarnain, 2011).  Effective independent directors with broad skill 
sets and experience are capable of providing checks and balance in boardroom deliberations 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003).  In addition, independent directors who provide constructive 
questions to the management will cause the managers to be more prudent before they make 
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decisions (McCabe & Nowak, 2008).  The MCCG (Revised, 2007), MCCG (2012) and Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements emphasize the importance of independent directors. In relation 
to board effectiveness, the board must consist of at least one-third of independent non-executive 
directors in order to ensure that these directors can provide independent judgment. Prior to 
the appointment, a few characteristics need to be evaluated namely their skills, knowledge, 
professionalism, experience, integrity and expertise. Effective and competent independent 
directors dissuade management from excessive risk taking to protect the shareholders and 
the company. Besides, Hasnah and Hasnah (2009) provide evidence that those independent 
directors who are able to provide unbiased views contribute to positive company performance. 
2.1.4 Directors’ accessibility to information
Directors must ensure that they receive adequate and meaningful materials prior to the board 
meetings so as to have adequate preparation (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003) and improve 
their problem solving ability during board deliberations (Macus, 2008). Besides, directors 
with sufficient information are able to provide constructive arguments to top management 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and enhance their accountability towards shareholders (Kula, 2005). 
Unable to do so, the directors will not have sufficient time to understand the issues, which 
will lead them to agree with the decisions of the CEO without voicing out any arguments 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003), even when company decisions are against shareholders’ 
interests namely, adopting excessive leverage. Further, Kula and Tatoglu (2006) assert that 
accessibility of information is the key component to improve company performance. Hasnah 
and Hasnah (2009) also find a positive association between accessibility of information and 
company performance.  Therefore, boards that get sufficient access to company information 
are expected to have positive impact on company leverage and performance.
2.2. Control variables
Three control variables were included in this study: company size, age and sector. These 
control variables were chosen based on previous literature as factors that may be associated 
with the company leverage and performance.
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) provides evidence that a large company is more likely to employ 
high leverage and most companies are in favor of long-term borrowings.  Larger companies 
are more diversified and able to increase their cash flow than smaller companies (Morri & 
Cristanziani, 2009). Consequently, these companies have the capability to service their 
loans and thus face lower risks of bankruptcy. With regards to company performance, larger 
companies can increase investors’ confidence in safeguarding investors’ interests (Tam & Tan, 
2007) and establish various diversifications in business (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Large 
companies are able to maintain stable cash flow and less likely to be affected by changes in the 
market environment (Fu, Ke & Huang, 2002). Furthermore, such companies have easy access 
to capital markets and this lead to lower bankruptcy risk (Feidakis & Rovolis, 2007). The 
characteristics and advantages of large companies lead to better performance.
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) finds that company age is positively associated with company 
leverage. Mature companies that have established themselves in the market find it easy to 
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obtain external financing since these companies have a good reputation. In relation to 
company performance, Noor Afza (2011a) indicates a negative association between company 
age and company performance. The rationale behind the finding is that older companies tend 
to become more conservative in strategy, thereby reducing company performance.  Company 
sector appears to be a primary determinant of capital structure because companies in similar 
industries tend to have similar needs in financing.
2.3. Board process mediates the relationship between the capital structure decisions and 
company performance
Board process is expected to improve company performance through its effect on company 
leverage. The 1997/1998 crisis shows that excessive leverage leads to company failure 
(Fong, 2008). Datuk Megat Najmuddin Khas argued that Malaysian directors particularly the 
non-executive directors did not carry out their duties diligently before the crisis (Thomas, 
2002). The evidence seems to suggest that if the board does not mitigate the risks of having 
excessive leverage, the company is more likely to suffer (Murphy & Brown, 2009).  Increases 
in leverage, in turn, lead to lower returns to shareholders. Companies with high dependency on 
debt financing have to pay fixed borrowing costs even if the business condition is not in their 
favor (Keown, Martin, Petty & Scott, 2008). In addition, commercial banks tend to charge 
those companies a higher interest rate because the possibility of defaulting on borrowings 
is higher. The situation reduces the company’s earning significantly and affects company 
performance as a whole. This helps in understanding that company performance suffers by 
having ineffective board members (Johnson et al., 1996) who are not able to encourage less 
risky capital structure decisions.
Thus, when directors perform their roles effectively, particularly their monitoring and 
services roles, they are expected to influence management to invest in a less risky capital 
structure (Mande, Park & Son, 2012).  The effectiveness of the board in influencing the capital 
structure decision will influence company performance.  The study suggests that it is crucial to 
empirically examine leverage as a potential mediator.  The mediating variables help to explain 
the relationship between board process and company performance.   
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Construction of questionnaire
This paper aims to determine the company leverage effects on the relationship between board 
process and company performance. The study uses two types of data which are questionnaire 
survey of Malaysian directors and the companies’ annual reports. Data on company 
characteristics and performance are extracted from the annual report of 2007 to 2009.  With 
regards to board process, a draft of the questionnaire was developed based on previous 
literature. Input from three representatives of two regulatory bodies and three directors of 
public listed companies enhanced the questionnaire content. The three representatives from a 
regulatory body included two specialists who are attached to the risk management department 
and frequently deal with CEOs and board members. They provided valuable input on how 
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directors should monitor their management, particularly with respect to risk management.  In 
addition, an executive chairman of a committee from a different regulatory body provided 
a range of perspectives on the role of directors. He emphasized the importance of the board 
and senior management in managing risks. Information provided by the three directors 
from three different well-known companies provided a better picture of board practices.  
Based on the interviews and past literature, an early draft of questionnaire was developed. 
Then, the draft was distributed to four directors and three senior academicians who have vast 
experience in survey studies. The preliminary study was conducted in order to clarify the 
items and ensure the relevancy of the items in the questionnaire. Based on their feedbacks, 
the questionnaire was corrected and amended. This was followed by a pilot study which was 
conducted within two months and involved 30 boards. The duration of pilot study and number 
of respondents proves that dealing with company directors is a demanding task.  Once the pilot 
test had been completed, the questionnaire was amended and a comprehensive questionnaire 
was then developed. Then, a full survey was carried out.  The complete questionnaire has three 
parts; first part consists of 31 items on board process, the second part consists of five factual 
questions of board practices and the last part consists of six demographics items. 
3.2. Sample size and data collection
The Malaysian company is chosen as the unit of analysis. The respondents are board of 
directors of Malaysian companies listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia. Studies that 
involve top executives always receive a low response rate, usually less than 25% (Westphal, 
1999). In Malaysia, the response rate for survey studies ranges from 10% to 20% (Hasnah & 
Hasnah, 2009). Therefore, the researcher believed that every public listed company should 
be included to increase the number of responses. This approach was similar to Wan and Ong 
(2005) that included the whole population of Singapore public listed companies as the sample. 
Wan and Ong’s (2005) study is intended to assess the link between board effectiveness and 
company performance.  There were 686 companies listed on the main board for the year 2009 
(after excluding companies which are listed under financial sector, new companies that are 
listed in 2007, 2008 and 2009 as well as PN17 and Ammended PN17 companies). 
The questionnaires were sent through mail to different directors (company chairman, 
independent director, non-independent non-executive director and executive director) via 
company secretary. The researcher intends to get response with balanced perspective. A support 
letter from Malaysian Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA) is 
enclosed in order to obtain more participation from company secretary. The questionnaire with 
cover letter to company secretary and directors and self-addressed, stamped-return envelopes 
were placed in every envelope to company secretary. Once responses from the questionnaire 
were obtained, they were matched against secondary data for the particular company. 
3.3. Measurements
There are three sets of variables which are board process, company performance and 
characteristics.  Return on equity (ROE) represents the company performance measurement. 
The ratio is determined by dividing net profit to the average shareholders equity. Even though 
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there is no consensus on the best measurement of financial performance, the most important 
point is that the result can reflect the shareholders’ and accounting return (Cochran & Wood, 
1984).  
In relation to board process, this study utilizes four process variables adapted by Kula (2005). 
The variables are board’s risk oversight, CEO performance evaluation, performance of 
independent directors and directors’ accessibility to information.  In relation to board’s risk 
oversight, “board communicates on risk tolerance to senior management” was taken from 
Sobel and Reding (2004). As suggested by Raber (2003), three statements were included: 
“board raises concerns about risk management”, “board receives updates from senior 
management on risk management matters”, and “board requires senior management to 
deliberate on emerging risks that the senior management perceives the company will face”. 
Meanwhile, “members of board encourage senior management to use scenario analysis in 
identifying potential vulnerabilities” was taken from Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). In 
addition, “board has necessary financial knowledge to analyze financial statements” was 
adopted from Murphy and Brown (2009) and “board reviews its strategy during crisis” was 
taken from Carey, Patsalox-Fox, and Useem (2009). Furthermore, as suggested by Wyman 
(2009), the statement “board attends relevant risk management training” was included. In 
measuring the board’s ability on risk oversight, five-point Likert scale was used: strongly 
disagree = 1, disagree = 2, neutral = 3, agree = 4 and strongly agree = 5.  Higher scores indicate 
higher ability of board on risk oversight.
In relation to CEO performance evaluation, eight statements were designed to represent the 
construct. One statement was adopted from Kula (2005): “board evaluates CEO by using key 
performance indicator (KPI)”.  “Board accepts feedback from CEO during the process of 
setting KPI” and “board provides avenue for CEO to explain the state of CEO’s performance” 
were taken from Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison, and Carroll (1995). A statement from 
Epstein and Roy (2005) was also included: “board communicates their expectations clearly to 
the CEO”. Furthermore, one statement was adopted from Wyman (2009), “board implements 
a reward system based on long-term performance”. Meanwhile, “board establishes an exit 
mechanism tied to CEO’s performance” was taken from Finkelstein and Mooney (2003).  Two 
other statements were adopted from Dulewicz and Herbert (1999; 2004): “board communicates 
to the CEO on his/her success based on the evaluation result” and “board communicates to the 
CEO on his/her failures based on the evaluation result”.  The statements were measured by 
using a five-point Likert scale similar to Kula (2005): strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree 
= 5.  Higher scores represent high effectiveness of board in evaluating CEO’s performance. 
Meanwhile, ten statements were adopted from Ingley and Van der Walt (2005) to represent 
the performance of independent directors. These statements include, for example, “Quality 
of independent directors’ contribution in board committees” and “Independent directors’ 
understanding of company business”. The statements were measured using a Likert-scale 
ranging from very poor = 1 to outstanding = 5. Higher scores indicate higher level of 
independent directors’ performance.  In measuring the directors’ accessibility to information, 
five statements and five-point scales (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 5) is used. 
Four statements were adapted from Sang-Woo and Il (2004) and MCCG (Revised, 2007): 
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“directors have access to information via management”, “when directors need to refer to 
company business records and books of accounts, their access is denied”, “when outside 
professional services are needed, the expenses will be borne by the company”, and “directors 
receive sufficient materials/information before board meetings”. Meanwhile, the statement 
“directors discuss issues thoroughly with management” was adapted from Ingley and Van 
der Walt (2005).  Higher score indicates good access of information by the directors.
This study includes three control variables; company size, age and sector. The log of total 
assets is used as proxy for company size (Noor Afza & Ayoib, 2009). Company age is 
measured by referring to the year of listed and it is subtracted with the date of financial year 
end in 2007, 2008 and 2009.  This study includes five sectors in representing the control 
variable: industrial product, trading/services, consumer product, construction and other. 
These sectors were represented by dummy variables.  However, during analysis the number of 
dummies used was one less than the number of sector categories (m-1), leaving out the dummy 
variable for other. Thus, four usable sectors were included in the analysis: industrial product, 
construction, consumer product, and trading and services.  
4.  RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1. Survey respondents
A total of 186 companies responded to the survey.  Out of these, nine were incomplete and 
two companies returned the questionnaire, leaving 175 as usable sample. According to the 
company secretary of two companies that returned the questionnaires, the companies have to 
uphold to its policies dictating that board members are not allowed to disclose their practices 
to outsiders.  The target population was 686 companies, thus the response rate was 25%. 
Out of 175 companies, 139 have single respondent and 36 companies with multiple 
respondents.  Similar to Wan and Ong (2005), an inter-rater reliability test was carried out 
individually for every company that had more than one respondent to determine the level 
of agreement between directors in the same company. The interclass correlation coefficient 
shows a level of correlation coefficient (r) of board process variables in the range between 
0.72 and 0.96.  These values of correlation (r) are acceptable to indicate that the respondents 
do have the same direction or perception towards their boards as a whole. For analysis 
purposes, the average scores of questionnaire items were used for companies with multiple 
respondents. 
 
4.2. Factor analysis and scale reliability
The result of factor analysis is shown in Table 1. A factor analysis on 31 items that relates 
to board process is conducted and four factors are extracted.  The factors explain 63% of 
the board process dimension. The scale reliability for each factor under board process is 
calculated. Internal reliability test presents strong Cronbach Alpha values for every factor 
ranging from 0.722 to 0.935. Following Nunnally (1978) suggestion, the values which is 
above 0.7 is acceptable.  Thus, the four factors under board process demonstrate a satisfactory 
level of reliability.  
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4.3. Descriptive statistics
A summary of the companies participated in this study is shown in Table 2, along with 
the industry composition.  The result denotes that industrial product represents the highest 
number of observation which is 59, followed by trading/ services (46), consumer product (23), 
construction (22) and other (25).  
As shown in Table 3, the result indicates that the mean figure of ROE is 2.61.  The mean value 
for performance of independent directors is 3.81, ranging from 2.58 to 4.80.  The mean value 
for board’s risk oversight and CEO performance evaluation is 3.97 and 3.83 respectively. 
Meanwhile, the mean for directors’ accessibility to information is 3.68. With regards to 
control variables, the sample companies have RM1,880,000 of total assets and listed for 
15 years on average.
Table 2: Summary of the Distribution of Sample Companies by Sector
Percentage (%)NSector
Industrial product 59 33.71
Trading/ services 46 26.29
Consumer product 23 13.14
Construction 22 12.58
Other 25 14.28
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Company Characteristics and Board Attributes
MaxSD MinMeanVariables
Return on equity 2.61 28.47 -213.89 62.58
Board’s risk oversight 3.97 0.42 2.80 5.00
CEO’s performance evaluation 3.83 0.46 2.48 5.00
Performance of independent directors 3.81 0.43 2.58 4.80
Accessibility of information 3.68 0.48 2.32 5.00
Company size (Total asset; RM’000) 1,880 6,787 25.84 69,643
Age of company (years) 15.28 11.64 2.00 48.00
4.4. Regression analysis
Upon running the regression analysis, the company size was transformed into logarithm to 
dissuade the heteroscedasticity problem.  Besides, test for multicolinearity was also carried 
out. Independent variables with variance inflation factor (VIF) values more than 10 show a 
serious multicolinearity (Chatterjee, Hadi and Price, 2000). The test indicated that there is no 
evidence of multicolinearity since the VIF value is between the range of 1.125 and 1.791.  
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Table 4 shows the analysis of mediation effects of capital structure decision on the relationship 
between board process and company performance.  As suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), 
mediation regression analysis needs to go through three steps.  
 
Table 4: Analysis on the Mediation (Company Leverage) Effects on Board Process and 
Company Performance




Testing steps in 
mediation model
Step 1      
Dependent: LEV    
Control: CSIZE 0.155**   
 AGECO -0.017   
 SECIP 0.068   
 SECCONS 0.174**   
 SECCP -0.010   
 SECTS 0.143*   
     
Independent: INDPERF -0.142*   
 RISKOV -0.197***   
 CEOEV -0.214***   
 ACCESSINF -0.158**   
   0.353 - 8.942***
Step 2     
Dependent: ROE    
Control: CSIZE 0.158**   
 AGECO -0.111   
 SECIP -0.022   
 SECCONS 0.056   
 SECCP 0.169**   
 SECTS 0.186**   
     
Independent: INDPERF 0.203**   
 RISKOV 0.210**   
 CEOEV 0.044   
 ACCESSINF 0.086   
   0.219 - 4.585***
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Step 3     
Dependent: ROE    
Control: CSIZE 0.185**   
 AGECO -0.113*   
 SECIP -0.010   
 SECCONS 0.086   
 SECCP 0.167**   
 SECTS 0.211**   
     
Mediator: LEV -0.173**   
     
Independent: INDPERF 0.179**   
 RISKOV 0.176**   
 CEOEV 0.007   
 ACCESSINF 0.059   
   0.238 0.019 4.627***
Table 4: Analysis on the Mediation (Company Leverage) Effects on Board Process and 
Company Performance (cont)
Notes: ***, **, * indicates regression analysis is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively
In the first step, the results indicate that performance of independent directors, board’s 
risk oversight, CEO performance evaluation and directors’ accessibility to information are 
negatively related with company leverage. The result suggests that board governance has 
significant influential in monitoring the capital structure decision makings. An effective 
board can influence the management to use other less risky financial instruments such as 
company internal funds (retained earnings or reserves) and equity instead of debs. With this 
result, the first requirement for mediation analysis is met.
In step 2, the direct effects of performance of independent directors, board’s risk oversight, 
CEO performance evaluation and directors’ accessibility to information on company 
performance which represented by return on equity are examined. The results indicate 
that performance of independent directors and board’s risk oversight have strong positive 
relationship with company performance at p-value < 0.05 respectively.  These results show 
that effective independent directors and boards with vigorous risks monitoring actions leads 
to sound company performance. Nevertheless, the other two variables of board process; 
CEO performance evaluation and directors’ accessibility to information are found to have 
insignificant relationship with the company performance.  
As in the third equation, the result shows that company leverage has a significant negative 
relationship with company performance at p-value < 0.05.  The insertion of company leverage 
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explains an additional 1.9% of the variance in company performance.  This result fulfills the 
third requirement of mediation analysis. Further, the coefficient for the performance of 
independent directors in steps 2 and 3 is reduced by 0.024; from 0.203 to 0.179, due to 
mediating effect of company leverage. Since the coefficient for the performance of independent 
directors changed when the company leverage is controlled, the result shows that there is 
a partial mediation effect of company leverage, suggesting that competent independent 
directors still have effects on company performance even when company leverage is excluded. 
Meanwhile, the result in step 2 and 3 (Table 4) also show that the coefficient between 
board’s risk oversight and company performance is reduced by 0.034, from 0.210 to 0.176. 
The reduction in the board’s risk oversight effect after company leverage has been controlled 
indicates the partial mediation of company leverage.  The study assumes that by devoting more 
attention to company risks particularly by investing in a less risky capital structure, contributes 
to the success of the company.  
Both CEO performance evaluation and directors’ accessibility to information failed to show 
a significant influence on company performance. These two variables do not fulfill the 
requirement in the second step of mediation analysis.  Therefore, further test which is related 
to the mediation effect is not being executed. In all models, company size and company 
involvement in the trading and services sector are shown to have a relationship with company 
leverage and performance.
5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The study attempts to find the capital structure decision effect as an intervening variable 
between board process and company performance.  An analysis of 175 Malaysian public listed 
companies reveals interesting result.  
The result of the study implies that decisions regarding company leverage mediate the 
relationship between the board’s risk oversight and company performance.  Boards with 
effective risk oversight place more emphasis on the risks that their companies might be 
exposed in order to determine the right capital structure decisions (Murphy & Brown, 
2009).  As excessive leverage creates more risks to the company, the used of minimal debt is 
preferable (Tam & Tan, 2007). Warrant Buffet also argues that companies must consider 
avoiding debt in order to succeed (Izma, 2009). Therefore, a less risky capital structure results 
from the board effectiveness in risk oversight, thus leading to improved company performance. 
Besides, the result also indicates that effective independent directors influence management 
to adopt lower leverage, which in turn enhances company performance. A less risky capital 
structure results when an effective group of independent directors closely monitor the 
company financing decisions and express their ideas on the risks involved in using financial 
instruments (Leblanc, 2004; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). Independent directors can apply their 
experience, particularly in managing company financing during financial crises, to encourage 
and advise the management to adopt less debt (Yeap, 2009). In an uncertain economy that 
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provides great challenges to businesses, companies with excessive leverage are exposed to 
liquidity risks (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) and less profitability (Tam & Tan, 2007).  If the 
economy is not in the company’s favor, companies with a low level of leverage have less risk 
as they do not have to struggle to pay back their debts (Keown et al., 2008).  These companies 
are more sustainable than those with excessive leverage.  This helps to explain how effective 
independent directors are able to influence company performance by encouraging less risky 
capital structure decisions. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that company capital structure does not have effect on the 
relationship between CEO’s performance evaluation and company performance. In addition, 
the study fails to find the influence of capital structure decisions on the association between 
accessibility of information and company performance. The reasons of such results are due 
to the results in the second step of mediation analysis that fail to show the effect of CEO 
performance evaluation and accessibility of information on company performance.  
With regards to CEO performance evaluation, the result is consistent with Hasnah and 
Hasnah (2009) who also find no association between the CEO performance evaluation 
and company performance. A possible explanation for this result is that the effectiveness 
of the CEO’s evaluation procedure is different from one company to another as there is no 
standardized procedure. From the questionnaire survey, it is found that 124 of 175 companies 
(71%) have a formal evaluation process, while the remaining 51 companies (29%) conduct 
their evaluation process informally.
Even though the MCCG (Revised, 2007) and MCCG (2012) strongly recommend the 
evaluation of CEOs by the board, the code does not provide details for carrying out such 
assessments. Although Bursa Malaysia (2009) issues a performance evaluation sheet to 
assist with the evaluation process, there is still no guarantee that every public listed company 
follows the template. Besides, company ownership also influences the evaluation process. 
Directors that have family ties with the controlling shareholders may reduce the effectiveness 
of the CEO’s evaluation (Westphal, 1999) due to the close relationship between them. 
The result also demonstrates that the directors’ accessibility to information and company 
performance are not significantly related, though it does show a positive regression coefficient. 
A possible explanation for the insignificant result is that the effectiveness of board in attaining 
access to company information could be best identified in the event of a company facing 
operational difficulties. At such times, directors are more likely to devote extra attention 
to monitoring the management decisions. The directors’ discussions, preparations and 
participation during board meetings tend to be more thorough when the business faces 
difficulties (Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas (1999) finds that company performance is likely to 
improve with frequent and high-quality board meetings.  The direction of the result is similar 
to Kula and Tatoglu (2006) and Hasnah and Hasnah (2009).
 
Company size is other influential factor on company performance. Large companies tend 
to have more diversified activities (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007), better disclosure (Fauzias 
& Bany, 2005) and more liquid (Fu et al., 2002), all of which may lead to sound company 
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performance. Further, the trading and services sector is found to have a positive impact on 
company performance. Under the 9th (2006 to 2010) and 10th (2011 to 2015) Malaysian 
Plans, the Malaysian government has identified the trading and services business as one of 
the potential new growth sectors in the economy.  This sector is expected to grow at 7.2% 
annually until 2015 (Malaysian Investment Development Authority, MIDA). The sector has 
been given various promotions to attract investors and incentives, which influence company 
performance. The result in this study is consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Noor 
Afza (2011b).
In the capital structure decision making process, managers always get to push through their 
preferences, which focus on debt instead of equity (Myers, 2001). Therefore, shareholders 
have to rely on the board of directors to evaluate and challenge management decisions. 
However, shareholders are under disadvantage if the decision turns out to be inefficient and 
very risky due to poor monitoring by the directors, which further reinforces the need to assess 
the board process in influencing capital structure decisions. 
The findings of the study suggest that board process is essential to the quality of company 
performance and capital structure decisions. The findings assist the board members to 
maximize their contributions to the stakeholders. By understanding the different dimensions 
of board process, the board could perform better during board deliberation. In the findings, the 
CEO performance evaluation by the board is found to be an essential determinant of capital 
structure decisions and company performance. As such, regulators, companies, shareholders 
and board members should emphasize the importance of more transparent evaluations, 
the details of which should be disclosed publicly. Specifically, regulators (particularly the 
Securities Commission) should specify the minimum requirement for evaluating the CEO’s 
performance in the code. Besides, this study contributes to board literatures whereby the 
directors’ duties in monitoring company risks and CEO performance evaluation are discussed 
in depth. With regards to theory, the use of agency theory in board process studies is still 
lacking (Hasnah & Hasnah, 2009). Therefore, this study applies the agency theory in the context 
of board process.  The result indicates that board process variables influence company leverage 
and performance. Vigorous monitoring by the board tends to put pressure on management, 
causing the managers to be more prudent in decision makings. This in turn, brings positive 
effect to company capital structure decisions and performance.   
With regards to future research, the dimension of board process need to explore further as 
board of director is seen as an important mechanism in corporate governance. Other board 
process variables such as managing conflicts and communication among board members may 
be included in future research.
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